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The introduction of the Human Rights Act and the public sector equality duty were 
intended to instil an equality and human rights culture into all public sector 
organisations in England and Wales. Yet, so far, this culture has not effectively taken 
hold. The Joint Committee on Human Rights labelled the operationalisation of human 
rights in public authorities as ‘patchy’ and the Independent Review of the Public Sector 
Equality Duty found very few concrete examples of where the duty had led to improved 
outcomes.1  
 
It was recognised from an early stage, that regulators and inspectorates had a 
significant role to play in establishing an equality and human rights culture in their 
sectors. In contrast to other enforcement mechanisms, regulators (which have 
coercive powers to compel action from regulatees) and inspectorates (which have 
powers to inspect services and report but lack coercive powers) have greater potential 
to establish real ‘sustainable behavioural change’ in the organisations that they 
oversee.2 However, so far the performance of regulators and inspectorates in this area 
is severely lacking. A report into the promotion of human rights found that the 
approaches of these bodies were ad hoc, uncertain and inconsistent and there was a 
general lack of confidence.3 Additionally, the Women and Equalities Committee 
recently criticised the Health and Safety Executive and Ofsted in two separate inquiries 
for a lack of inclusion of key equality issues in their work.4 
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One of the key reasons for the limited performance of regulators and inspectorates in 
equality and human rights enforcement to date is that it is yet to be made clear what 
role regulators and inspectorates can play in the enforcement of equality and human 
rights. This article is intended to begin to fill this gap by arguing that they have two 
important roles: (i) ensuring compliance in the organisations they oversee, and (ii) 
encouraging mainstreaming by embedding mechanisms for reflexive learning within 
organisations. The article begins by outlining the distinction between the negative and 
positive elements of equality and human rights and makes clear that while a 
compliance model is appropriate for negative elements, it is ill-suited for positive 
elements, which as forms of reflexive regulation require more proactive enforcement. 
The second section outlines one such model put forward by Sandra Fredman.5 It is 
argued that to better advance equality and human rights three significant 
developments need to be made to this model. I then argue that regulators and 
inspectorates have an important role in this expanded model. The rest of the article 
then goes on to outline how regulators and inspectorates can be most effective within 
this model by incentivising the embedding of reflexive learning within organisations. 
The article concludes by illustrating these arguments with the example of the Care 
Quality Commission.  
 
Positive Duties and Reflexive Regulation  
Equality and human rights obligations have both positive and negative elements.6 The 
negative elements, such as the right to freedom from interference with the person or 
property or direct discrimination which prohibits organisations from treating individuals 
less favourably because of a protected characteristic,7 focus on preventing the state 
and other regulated organisations from engaging in certain prohibited actions. The 
negative elements have primarily been enforced using the compliance model, where 
litigation is used to ensure that regulated organisations comply with both the formal 
legal rules (first-order compliance) and rulings of judicial or other bodies (second-order 
                                                          
5 Sandra Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (OUP 2008) ch 6.  
6 Asbjørn Eide, ‘The Right to Adequate Food as a Human Right’ (1983) UN Doc E/CN4/Sub.2 2; Bob 
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compliance).8 However, it has been recognised that there are many other barriers to 
full participation in a society other than state interference (such as poverty, 
stereotypes, assumptions and conformist pressures). This has led to an increasing 
recognition of the positive elements of equality and human rights which advance a 
richer conception of freedom that focuses on removing a wider range of barriers.9  
 
These positive elements of equality and human rights, such as the public sector 
equality duty and the requirement to protect individuals whose lives are at risk,10  
require positive measures such as preventing individuals from being harmed and/or 
improving their situation.11 Mainstreaming has been recognised as particularly 
important for fulfilling positive duties.12 This requires that equality and human rights 
norms, standards and principles are incorporated into ‘decision-making on policies, 
operational issues and budgets, be made part of an organisation’s bureaucratic 
process, culture, and be internalised by staff.’13 Positive duties recognise that there 
are different ways to mainstream equality and human rights norms into an organisation 
and the most effective methods are likely to be organisation specific and so general 
goals are set rather than prescribed steps. Additionally, it recognises that 
mainstreaming is a continuous endeavour and that equality and human rights can 
always be further advanced. Deliberation is especially important as organisations 
mainstream most effectively if they understand the equality and human rights 
consequences of their actions on their users.14  
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(Cambridge University Press 2012) 477, 493.  
9 Sandra Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (OUP 2008) ch 1; 
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Law 712; Aernout Nieuwenhuis, ‘A positive obligation under the ECHR to ban hate speech?’ [2019] 
Public Law 326.  
10 S 149 Equality Act 2010; Osman v United Kingdom (2000) 29 EHRR 245.  
11 Sandra Fredman, ‘Human rights transformed: positive duties and positive rights’ [2006] Public Law 
498; Sandra Fredman, ‘Substantive equality revisited’ (2016) 14(3) International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 712.   
12 Bob Hepple, The New Single Equality Act in Britain (2010) 5 The Equal Rights Review 11, 13; Paul 
Hunt, ‘Configuring the UN Human Rights System in the “Era of Implementation”: Mainland and 
Archipelago’ (2017) 39 Human Rights Quarterly 489, 501. 
13 Gerd Oberleitner, ‘A Decade of Mainstreaming Human Rights in the UN: Achievements, Failures, 
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‘Mainstreaming Human Rights’ in Colin Harvey (ed), Human Rights in the Community: Rights as 
Agents for Change (Hart 2005). 
14 Sandra Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (OUP 2008) 155.  
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At the same time as the restrictions of negative duties have been recognised, the 
compliance model of enforcement has also been criticised.  It is limited in that it is 
reactive rather than proactive, it is costly and inaccessible, it is limited to where there 
is an identifiable victim and wrongdoer, and it is largely individualistic so does not 
address the underlying structural issues.15 In particular, as there is no one way to 
effectively mainstream, the compliance model of enforcement has been recognised as 
ill-suited to enforcing positive duties and thus alternative models have been put 
forward based on reflexive regulation theory.  
 
Reflexive regulation theory argues that society is made up of different systems (such 
as law, education, health, politics) and that each system has its own norms and 
rationality. Systems are normatively closed meaning they produce their own norms 
and thus do not recognise norms from other systems. On the basis of this, it is argued 
that the classic models of regulation (formal law with universal legal rules and 
substantive law with purposive goal-orientated interventions) are ineffective as these 
norms will not necessarily be heard and enacted by the different systems in the 
manner intended by the legal system.16 This results in what Teubner terms the 
‘regulatory trilemma’ where law is ignored by the sub-system, damages the receiving 
sub-system or the legal system is itself damaged.17  
 
Reflexive law can overcome the regulatory trilemma. This is because, although 
systems are normatively closed, they are cognitively open, meaning that they can 
observe other systems and the environment and be indirectly affected by them. 
Reflexive law aims to work within this paradigm by adopting indirect regulation 
strategies. It does this by utilising procedural norms to develop reflexion structures 
within other social systems by shaping systems’ internal discourses and methods of 
                                                          
15 Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 285-6; Colm O’Cinneide, ‘The catalytic 
potential of equality and human rights commissions’ (2016) 24(1) Journal of Poverty and Social 
Justice 7, 8; Tom Hickman Public Law’s Disgrace (2017), available at 
https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2017/02/09/tom-hickman-public-laws-disgrace. 
16 Gunther Teubner, ‘Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law’ (1983) 17(2) Law & Society 
Review 239; Gunther Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System (Blackwell 1993).  
17 Gunther Teubner, ‘Juridification: Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions’ in Gunther Teubner (ed), 
Juridification of Social Spheres: A Comparative Analysis of the Areas of Labor, Corporate, Antitrust 
and Social Welfare Law (Walter de Gruyter 1987).  
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coordination between systems.18 By seeing the positive elements of equality and 
human rights law as reflexive law, Fredman recognises that positive duties will be 
more effective if they are aimed towards more general rather than specific goals. On 
this basis, she argues that there are different routes to achieving these goals and thus 
that deliberation is particularly important as it encourages organisations ‘to review and 
revise their conclusions in the light of their exposure to their own and others’ 
experiences and perspectives’ making it more likely that mainstreaming will be real 
and effective.19 Fredman then goes on to outline the ideal enforcement model based 
upon this reflexive law system, which should facilitate and enhance deliberation. The 
next section discusses this ideal enforcement model and argues that it needs to be 
developed in three key ways. On the basis of this developed model, there is a greater 
role for regulators and inspectorates and the rest of this article then discusses how 
this can best be realised. 
 
Positive Duties and The Ideal Enforcement Model 
Fredman argues that the ideal enforcement model should involve a wide range of 
actors including stakeholders/right-bearers, civil society, national equality and human 
rights institutions, and courts.20 The model should contain both internal and external 
mechanisms of enforcement. Internally, deliberation would act as a mechanism of 
enforcement by deliberators holding organisations to account. However, these internal 
mechanisms would be insufficient on their own as deliberation takes place within limits. 
These limits include that it is not open-ended but must be undertaken with the aim of 
advancing specific equality and human rights goals; it can result in no outcome being 
reached; power differentials can make it ineffective and; evidence shows that without 
external mechanisms some organisations will resist change.21 Consequently, there is 
a need for external mechanisms in the form of incentives and sanctions to trigger 
action within organisations. However, it is important that the balance between internal 
                                                          
18 Gunther Teubner, ‘Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law’ (1983) 17(2) Law & Society 
Review 239; Julia Black, ‘Constituting Self-Regulation’ (1996) 59(1) Modern Law Review 24.  
19 Sandra Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (OUP 2008) 155; 
Olean Hankivsky, Diego de Merich, Ashlee Christoffersen, ‘Equalities ‘devolved’: experiences in 
mainstreaming across the UK devolved powers post-Equality Act 2010’ (2019) 14(2) British Politics 
141.  
20 Sandra Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (OUP 2008) 169. 




and external mechanisms is sufficient as, if it is too focused on external mechanisms, 
this can inhibit deliberation. Therefore, Fredman, building on the work of Hepple and 
responsive regulation scholars such as Ayers and Braithwaite, argues that an 
enforcement pyramid should be utilised.22 This envisages that most enforcement will 
take the form of persuasion or advice. However, if this is not effective then more severe 
methods are increasingly utilised as enforcement moves up the pyramid. On the basis 
of this, Fredman argues that the bottom levels should consist of a combination of 
internal enforcement via deliberation and external enforcement by stakeholders, right-
bearers and civil society holding organisations to account. Further up the pyramid, 
equality and human rights institutions hold organisations to account and help them to 
build mechanisms for mainstreaming equality and human rights and the infrastructure 
for deliberation. At the top of the pyramid are courts that require decision-makers to 
deliberate. Through the use of the pyramid, the enforcers in this proactive enforcement 
model should ‘produce a whole that is greater than the sum of the parts'.23 Finally, 
although regulators and inspectorates do not feature centrally in Fredman’s model, 
building on Black’s work, she argues that they should play the role of mediators to help 
overcome problems of deliberation (by translating between deliberators and mapping 
and resolving discourses).24 
  
As outlined above, given the complexity of mainstreaming and that there is no one 
correct result to be achieved, the use of reflexive regulation is apt. In particular, the 
use of deliberation is important to make organisations aware of the experiences of 
those that are directly affected by the organisation’s actions. The enforcement model 
is well designed to advance positive duties. However, it can be developed in three key 
ways which will make it more effective. By expanding the ideal enforcement model it 
is possible to outline an important role for regulators and inspectorates, which will be 
developed in the rest of the article.  
 
                                                          
22 Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate 
(Oxford University Press 1992); Bob Hepple, Mary Coussey and Tufyal Choudhury, Equality: A New 
Framework (Hart 2000).  
23 Sandra Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (OUP 2008) 158, 
169.  
24 Julia Black, ‘Proceduralizing Regulation: Part II’ (2001) 21(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 33; 
Sandra Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (OUP 2008) 158. 
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There are three main ways the ideal proactive enforcement model put forward by 
Fredman can be developed: (i) a re-casting of the enforcement pyramid; (ii) the model 
incorporating mechanisms to deal with situations where deliberation fails; (iii) and the 
model recognising an expanded role for regulators and inspectorates. In relation to the 
enforcement pyramid, although it is outlined as a means to encourage positive action, 
in reality, it is better suited to ensuring compliance. This is because, as outlined earlier, 
positive measures require action to be taken towards specific goals, but there is no 
one correct way to advance these goals and the means and solutions adopted will be 
most effective if they are organisation-specific. Given the different approaches 
adopted by organisations and that courts will not be involved in deliberation, it will be 
difficult and arguably inappropriate, for courts to assess the quality and effectiveness 
of these steps. Instead, courts will only be able to assess positive duties to a certain 
minimum threshold level (for example, whether organisations have had due regard, or 
progressively taken steps to realise the goals).25 However, beyond this threshold level, 
a wide variety of action can be taken of varying quality. If we want to advance equality 
and human rights as fully as possible then organisations need to be incentivised to 
adopt the very best practice. The enforcement pyramid, with courts at the top, is not 
the most effective structure in which to achieve this as it is focused on ensuring 
organisations meet (or comply) with the threshold level and does not encourage action 
beyond this. This risks the legal threshold becoming a ceiling for positive action rather 
than a floor. A more appropriate use of the pyramid would be to invert it. In this way, 
court action would be the first action taken against the small number of organisations 
that are unwilling to comply (for example, those that have not had due regard). Then 
after this point, enforcement mechanisms would get softer, more educative and more 
supportive to help further embed mainstreaming into organisations. It will be argued 
later that regulators and inspectorates are especially apt in fulfilling this role.   
 
Secondly, although recognising deliberation may be inadequate or may not reach a 
conclusion, the enforcement model has no clear mechanism for encouraging 
mainstreaming in the absence of deliberation, with all steps of the pyramid geared 
towards encouraging deliberation. There is a danger of circularity with unsatisfactory 
deliberation being met with enforcement mechanisms that encourage more 
                                                          
25 Equality Act 2010, s 149; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Art 2(1).  
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unsatisfactory deliberation, which organisations can use as an excuse for inaction. 
Even successful deliberation can take time and so there is a need for any model to 
have mechanisms in place to encourage and guide organisations where deliberation 
is ongoing or is proving unsuccessful, otherwise the advancement of equality and 
human rights can be continually delayed. Again, it will be argued later that regulators 
and inspectorates are uniquely placed to undertake this task.  
 
Finally, the role given to regulators and inspectorates in the enforcement model should 
be expanded. The primary role Fredman advocates to regulators and inspectorates, 
based on the work of Black, is that of a mediator, mediating when there are problems 
of deliberation within organisations. However, Black's work focuses on how to ensure 
the public interest is taken into account in private regulation. It is not clear that the 
same approach is feasible in relation to public regulation. Thus, the sheer scale of 
public organisations in Britain, the frequency in which actions of these organisations 
raise equality and human rights concerns, and the regularity of deliberation means 
that it is simply not possible for regulators and inspectorates to play this role and thus 
this overstates what these bodies can achieve. However, regulators and inspectorates 
can play a much greater role within the expanded enforcement model, which will be 
discussed in the next section.  
 
Ensuring compliance and supporting mainstreaming through reflexive learning  
The previous section developed Fredman's equality and human rights enforcement 
model for positive duties, arguing that to maximise the advancement of equality and 
human rights, the ideal enforcement model requires institutions that encourage 
deliberation but have mechanisms in place for when deliberation fails, ensures 
organisations comply with the law and encourages organisations to go further and 
mainstream. This section argues that regulators and inspectorates can play a key role 
in this expanded model. This is because, as Teubner and Black recognise, regulators 
and inspectorates are in a privileged position, operating between systems (e.g. the 
CQC operates between the health, social care and legal systems). This enables them 
to have greater influence within specific systems than other outsider enforcement 
bodies and can make the legal requirements more system-specific so they are more 
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relevant and accessible to organisations within the regulated system.26 In particular, it 
is argued that through their frameworks, they can embed models of learning into the 
organisations they oversee, which can incentivise organisations to mainstream 
equality and human rights and go beyond their formal legal duties.  
 
Theories of learning have been utilised in other contexts such as healthcare 
governance and administrative justice but have not yet been incorporated into theories 
of equality and human rights enforcement.27  Learning theory moves the focus away 
from the idea of reaching a point of complete knowledge to ideas of continuous 
learning.28 This is especially apt for the positive measures of equality and human rights 
as it recognises that there is no fixed point to reach but that continuous evolution is 
required, which sits well with the idea of mainstreaming and the model of reflexive 
regulation.29 Learning operates at different levels (for example the individual, the team 
and the organisation) and one of the current limitations of learning theory concerns 
how learning at different levels links together (e.g. how knowledge gained by an 
individual is transmitted to the organisation).30 While recognising these difficulties, the 
article aims to avoid them by focusing on learning at the organisational level (i.e. how 
regulators and inspectorates can encourage learning with the organisations they 
oversee). There are different theories of learning,31 but the framework put forward by 
Lenoble and Maesschalck is best suited to enforce positive models of equality and 
human rights as it works well in the enhanced enforcement model outlined in the 
previous section which centres on facilitating deliberation, is progressive (so suited to 
                                                          
26 Gunther Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System (Blackwell 1993) 89-90; Julia Black, ‘Constituting 
Self-Regulation’ (1996) 59(1) Modern Law Review 24, 46.  
27 Peter Vincent-Jones, ‘Embedding Economic Relationships through Social Learning? The Limits of 
Patient and Public Involvement in Healthcare Governance in England’ (2011) 38(2) Journal of Law 
and Society 215; Robert Thomas, ‘Administrative justice, better decisions, and organisational 
learning’ [2015] Public Law 111. 
28 Jan-Peter Voβ and René Kemp, ‘Sustainability and reflexive governance: Introduction’ in Jan-Peter 
Voβ, Direk Bauknecht and René Kemp (eds), Reflexive Governance for Sustainable Development 
(Edward Elgar 2006) 7.  
29 Neil Gunningham, ‘Regulatory Reform and Reflexive Regulation: Beyond Command and Control’ in 
Eric Brousseau, Tom Dedeurwaerdere and Bernd Siebenhüner (eds), Reflexive Governance for 
Global Public Goods (MIT Press 2012).  
30 James Samuel Colemen, Foundations of Social Theory (Harvard University Press 1990); Fabrizio 
Gilardi and Claudio M Radaelli, ‘Governance and Learning’ in David Levi-Faur (ed), The Oxford 
Handbook of Governance (Oxford University Press 2012). 
31 For example, Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger, Situated learning: Legitimate peripheral participation 
(Cambridge University Press 1991).  
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an inverted pyramid) and also at the same time addresses situations where 
deliberation is ineffective.  
 
Lenoble and Maesschalck outline four approaches to learning, all of which operate on 
a scale, progressively expanding the conditions for the success of learning.32  The 
attainment of maximum learning requires a combination of all four approaches.33  The 
first approach is neo-institutionalist, which rather than imposing arbitrary external 
conditions on organisations, requires that the external conditions that are imposed are 
optimal (i.e. the most effective they can be).34  For regulators and inspectorates, this 
would mean that, rather than encouraging one standard path to mainstreaming in 
organisations, regulators and inspectorates would learn about different paths through 
evaluation of organisations’ performances across the sector and advocate the best 
one(s) to organisations. Although the neo-institutionalist approach is the least 
expansive for learning, it is particularly important in the context of equality and human 
rights as it provides opportunities for learning when deliberation is ineffective, which it 
was argued in the previous section is crucial under the developed enforcement model.   
 
However, the neo-institutionalist approach is not sufficient on its own to establish full 
learning and hence deep mainstreaming, as the approach does not ensure that those 
who apply the conditions (i.e. organisations) do so in the manner intended by those 
who imposed the conditions (i.e. the regulator/inspectorate) and thus how 
mainstreaming is executed and the effects it has may be different from those 
envisaged by the regulator/inspectorate. The second approach, the deliberative 
approach, expands on the neo-institutionalist approach, with learning taking place 
through different actors sharing their unique perspectives on the best way to undertake 
                                                          
32 Jacques Lenoble and Marc Maesschalck, ‘Renewing the Theory of Public Interest: The Quest for a 
Reflexive and Learning-based Approach to Governance’ in Olivier De Schutter and Jacques Lenoble 
(eds), Reflexive Governance: Redefining the Public Interest in a Pluralistic World (Oxford: Hart, 2010) 
8. 
33 Peter Vincent-Jones, ‘Embedding Economic Relationships through Social Learning? The Limits of 
Patient and Public Involvement in Healthcare Governance in England’ (2011) 38(2) Journal of Law 
and Society 215, 221. 
34 Olivier De Schutter and Jacques Lenoble, ‘Renewing the Theory of Public Interest: The Quest for a 
Reflexive and Learning-based Approach to Governance’ in Olivier De Schutter and Jacques Lenoble 




collective action.35  Under this approach, regulators and inspectorates would 
incentivise organisations to have measures in place to encourage deliberation, such 
as involving right-holders in decisions made about them and engaging with a diverse 
range of individuals and groups in discussions about the future direction of services. 
Nevertheless, learning is still constrained as deliberation takes place within pre-
determined power dynamics and actors often lack the capacities to effectively engage 
in deliberation. 
 
The third pragmatic approach aims to overcome the restrictions of the deliberative 
approach by encouraging actors to engage in a process of joint inquiry, where 
discussions are open and all actors contribute to, and should learn from, the inquiry.  
All actors are involved in designing solutions, monitoring performance and adjusting 
solutions accordingly.36  Yet, even if actors are equal partners in deliberation, they can 
still lack the capacities to engage in the joint inquiry in reality. Thus, other proponents 
of the pragmatist approach argue that the pre-existing frames (such as previous 
experiences and beliefs) which inhibit learning also need to be questioned.37  
Therefore, actors should not only engage in joint action but also agree on the framing 
of issues (e.g. what are the problems, what are possible solutions, what are the 
challenges) to more effectively learn and thus increase their success.  Regulators and 
inspectorates could embed the pragmatic approach into organisations by requiring 
organisations not just to deliberate with right-holders and stakeholders but show how 
they were actively involved at all stages of any discussion, such as examining the 
extent that front-line staff at the organisation are able to develop and enact policies. 
The limit of the pragmatist approach is that it assumes that knowledge of the limitations 
of framing is sufficient to encourage actors to reframe issues.  
 
                                                          
35 Jacques Lenoble and Marc Maesschalck, ‘Renewing the Theory of Public Interest: The Quest for a 
Reflexive and Learning-based Approach to Governance’ in Olivier De Schutter and Jacques Lenoble 
(eds), Reflexive Governance: Redefining the Public Interest in a Pluralistic World (Oxford: Hart, 2010) 
13. 
36 Charles Sabel and Joshua Cohen, ‘Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy’ (1997) 3 European Law Journal 
313; Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, ‘Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of 
Experimentalist Governance in the EU’ (2008) 14 European Law Journal 271.  
37 Chris Argyris and Donald Schön, Theory in Practice: Increasing Professional Effectiveness 
(Hoboken, NJ: Jossey Bass, 1974); Chris Argyris and Donald Schön, Organizational Learning: A 
Theory of Action Perspective (Boston, MA: Addison Wesley, 1978); Chris Argyris, Knowledge for 
Action: A Guide to Overcoming Barriers to Organizational Change (Hoboken, NJ: Jossey Bass, 1993).   
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The final approach, the genetic approach, argues that knowledge of the problems of 
framing is insufficient to induce actors to overcome them.  Instead, conditions must be 
put in place that encourage actors to question their representations and the role that 
they play and construct a new identity that the context requires.  Actors should achieve 
this by learning from their past (by considering what specific identities were taken in 
the past and what capacities contributed to these identities) and then re-imagining 
ways to act collectively in the future that are not constrained by the existing frames.38  
In this way, actors are truly free to learn without constraints and thus can most 
effectively engage in joint inquiries to tackle collective problems. Regulators and 
inspectorates could encourage the embedding of a genetic approach in organisations 
by assessing the extent that past lessons are openly shared and discussed by all 
parties to arrive at new innovative solutions.   
 
This article has argued so far that equality and human rights law consists of negative 
and positive elements. The negative elements have traditionally utilised a compliance 
model of enforcement and both have been recognised to be limited in the pursuit of 
the maximum realisation of equality and human rights. This has led to increased 
emphasis being placed on the positive elements. However, the compliance model of 
enforcement is generally ill-suited for the enforcement of positive duties. In this light, 
an enforcement model put forward by Fredman was discussed and expanded. On this 
basis, it was argued that the enforcement model should encourage deliberation, have 
mechanisms in place to encourage mainstreaming where deliberation was not 
possible and be able to work in the context of an inverted pyramid (i.e. ensure 
organisations comply with the legal obligations but then incentivise and support them 
going beyond this). Finally, it was argued that the privileged position of regulators and 
inspectorates across different systems meant they had a crucial role to play in this 
context, both ensuring that regulated organisations comply with equality and human 
rights law, while, at the same time, encouraging and supporting organisations to go 
further and mainstream. I argued that in terms of supporting organisations to 
mainstream, regulators and inspectorates could do this by using their assessment 
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frameworks to embed learning into organisations. The final section explores these 
arguments in the context of the work of the Care Quality Commission.  
 
Ensuring Compliance and Supporting Mainstreaming in Practice: The Example 
of the Care Quality Commission  
The remainder of this article will explore the practices of the CQC through the 
previously outlined lens of compliance, mainstreaming and reflexive learning. The 
CQC has been chosen for two reasons. Firstly, the CQC has both a regulatory and 
inspectorate role and thus the potential of both regulators and inspectorates can be 
observed by examining the operations of one body in depth. Secondly, the CQC has 
gone further than most other regulators and inspectorates in incorporating equality 
and human rights standards into its work. It started doing this at an early stage of its 
creation39 and now has a clearly set out and transparent approach to incorporation. It 
has worked closely with a range of other organisations to optimise its approach 
(particularly the British Institute of Human Rights and the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission)40 and it is continuously evaluating and improving this approach.41 Thus, 
the CQC provides a good illustration of how regulators and inspectorates can both 
ensure compliance and support mainstreaming in organisations.42   
 
Ensuring Compliance 
The CQC inspects a wide range of providers within the health and social care sector 
and uses key lines of enquiry to rate services based on four levels of provision: 
outstanding, good, requires improvement and inadequate.  The Commission focuses 
on ensuring the standard of care is good (i.e. goes beyond what is expected under the 
fundamental standards in the regulations) and so this forms the starting point of any 
inspection.43  If it appears to the inspectors that the provided care may go beyond the 
level of good they will assess the provider against the outstanding level.  Alternatively, 
if they think the standard of care may be below the level of good they will explore if it 
                                                          
39 CQC, ‘Human rights approach for our regulation of health and social care services’ (CQC 2014) 5.  
40 CQC, ‘Human rights approach for our regulation of health and social care services’ (CQC 2014) 18-
26. 
41 CQC, ‘Human rights approach for our regulation of health and social care services’ (CQC 2014) 27-
29. 
42 This does not mean that the CQC has been without criticism though. For example, the EHRC has 
criticised it for not explicitly referring to human rights in its work: EHRC, ‘Close to home: An inquiry 
into older people and human rights in home care’ (EHRC 2011) 87.  
43 CQC, ‘Guidance for providers on meeting the regulations’ (CQC 2015) 9. 
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meets the requires improvement or inadequate levels.  At this stage, alongside 
assessing whether the standard of care is inadequate or requires improvement, 
inspectors will also consider if any of the fundamental standards in the regulations 
have been breached.44  It is at this stage that compliance with equality and human 
rights is primarily enforced as the fundamental standards incorporate many of the 
requirements of equality and human rights law.   
 
For example, regulation ten requires that service users are treated with dignity and 
respect.  This requires that providers respect the privacy of service users when they 
provide care. The Commission has expanded on the need to respect privacy by 
requiring providers to take reasonable steps to make sure discussions about care only 
take place where they cannot be heard, that individuals have privacy when they 
receive treatment and that any surveillance is in the best interests of service users.45  
Although not explicitly linked to human rights law, these requirements incorporate 
aspects of the right to privacy.46  Providers also need to deliver care in a non-
discriminatory way in order to comply with regulation ten.  The guidance explicitly links 
this requirement to the prohibited conduct in the Equality Act 2010 (discrimination, 
harassment and victimisation) and the public sector equality duty.47   
 
Not meeting the fundamental standards contained in the regulation can have serious 
consequences for providers.  There are two methods of enforcement that the 
Commission can take, and a combination of both methods is possible.  The first 
method is informal, in which enforcement powers are not used and the Commission 
works with a provider to improve standards.  The second method is formal, where 
enforcement action is taken to compel improvement.48  In relation to the informal 
method, where a provider has fallen below the fundamental standards it will normally 
                                                          
44 CQC, ‘Enforcement policy’ (CQC 2015) 8. The Commission worked with the Department of Health 
to ensure that equality and human rights considerations were incorporated into the fundamental 
standards: Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2014, SI 2014/2936. 
45 CQC, ‘Guidance for providers on meeting the regulations’ (CQC 2015) 34. 
46 For example, recognising a right to confidentiality around information relating to a person’s health 
(Z v Finland (1998) 25 EHRR 371), a positive obligation to ensure a minimum level of privacy during 
detention (Szafrański v Poland (2017) 64 EHRR 23), and a right to protection from state surveillance 
(Klass and Others v Germany (1979-80) 2 EHRR 214).  
47 CQC, ‘Guidance for providers on meeting the regulations’ (CQC 2015) 35. 
48 CQC, ‘Enforcement policy’ (CQC 2015) 7.  
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be rated inadequate.49  Where the standard of care provided by a provider is judged 
to be inadequate, the provider is placed into special measures.  Through special 
measures, the Commission ensures that providers do not continue to provide 
inadequate care, provide a clear and consistent timeframe within which providers are 
required to improve, provide criteria for providers to exit special measures and outline 
the consequences of failing to make sufficient progress within the timeframe.50  At the 
end of the timeframe, if the provider has made sufficient improvements it will be taken 
out of special measures.  Alternatively, if the provider has not made suitable progress, 
the Commission will resort to its formal enforcement powers (although as stated 
earlier, it may also utilise its formal powers earlier if the standard of care is especially 
low, for example where there is a risk of harm to service users).51  The formal 
enforcement powers include issuing a requirement notice (requiring the provider to 
produce a report that shows how it will comply with its legal obligations); issuing a 
warning notice (which warns a provider that the Commission thinks it has breached/is 
breaching its legal duties); imposing, varying or removing conditions of registration; 
suspending registration; cancelling registration; and prosecution.52   
 
By incorporating equality and human rights standards into the fundamental standards 
that all providers of health and social care providers must meet and having the ultimate 
powers to cancel a provider’s registration and/or prosecute the provider (and 
individuals at the provider), the CQC can use sanctions to enhance compliance with 
equality and human rights standards within the health and social care sector in 
England.  Even more important than ensuring compliance, regulators and 
inspectorates have a crucial role in supporting organisations to mainstream equality 
and human rights through incentivising the embedding of reflexive learning into 
organisations and it is on this role that the rest of the article focuses. 
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‘Enforcement policy’ (CQC 2015) 8. 
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In addition to ensuring that providers within the health and social care sector comply 
with equality and human rights law, the CQC, using incentives, also heavily 
encourages organisations to go further and implement higher standards in their 
practices.  The minimum expectation is that providers will be rated as good and the 
standards of care required under the good rating exceed the fundamental standards 
that all providers are expected to meet (i.e. in many circumstances the Commission 
requires providers to go beyond what is formally required by law).  For example, in the 
key lines of enquiry for healthcare services, when assessing the quality of care, a 
provider rated as good would not only have to refrain from engaging in discriminatory 
conduct but would also need to take steps to understand a person’s personal, cultural, 
social and religious needs and incorporate these needs into the person’s care, 
treatment and support.53  Additionally, in relation to effectiveness, a good provider of 
adult social care services does not only ensure that people are involved in decisions 
about their care but also gathers information about consent-related activities and uses 
this information to improve how services are delivered in the future.54 
 
Furthermore, the highest rating a provider can achieve, outstanding, is heavily linked 
with a high level of implementation of equality and human rights into a provider’s 
organisation and service provision.  For example, while a good provider of adult care 
services will always respect people’s right to privacy and confidentiality and challenge 
behaviour and practice that falls short of this, an outstanding provider will have an 
equality, diversity and human rights approach to support people’s privacy and dignity 
which is well embedded in the service and has positive outcomes for people.55  
Additionally, whereas a good provider of healthcare services will understand people’s 
personal, cultural, social and religious needs and incorporate these into the individual’s 
care, treatment and support, an outstanding provider will recognise the totality of these 
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needs, find innovative ways to meet them and regard them as important as their 
physical needs.56 
 
Regulators and inspectorates can encourage reflexive learning and thus greater 
mainstreaming of equality and human rights through the provision of information 
around best practice and via the encouragement of practices that will lead to self-
learning within providers. This approach is combined with panopticism - providers 
know they will be assessed on these aspects during inspections but they do not know 
when inspections will take place (the majority of inspections are unannounced), and 
thus providers need to behave as if they could be assessed at any time, which acts to 
ensure these behaviours are permanently in place.57 In addition to incorporating 
equality and human rights into the fundamental standards and key lines of enquiry for 
the different services, the CQC also provides a good practice guide for implementing 
equality and human rights into health and social care providers.  The guide contains 
case studies of seven providers who were rated outstanding and are judged to be the 
very best providers in relation to equality and human rights.   
 
The case studies provide illustrations of the examples of outstanding standards 
discussed earlier.  Thus, Castlebar Nursing Home is an example of a provider taking 
an equality, diversity and human rights approach to support people’s privacy and 
dignity which is well embedded in the service and has positive outcomes for people.  
There, people were cared for in a way that respected their cultural identity.  The 
diversity of staff matched that of the service users and where possible service users 
were matched with a staff member with a similar cultural background.  In this way, the 
inspection team observed a service user with dementia and a staff member discussing 
stories from their home country and both were visibly enjoying these conversations.  
The Care Centre was able to help the user maintain their cultural heritage through 
these conversations and from the playing of cultural music. This relationship had a 
positive effect on the user’s care as she was more willing to communicate her needs 
in relation to her treatment and care.58 
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East London NHS Foundation Trust and Herstmonceux Integrative Health Centre are 
examples of outstanding providers that recognise the totality of an individual’s 
emotional and social needs, find innovative ways to meet them and regard them as 
important as their physical needs.  In the East London NHS Foundation Trust, there 
was a department of spiritual, religious and cultural care that recognised the 
importance of these needs in contributing to individuals’ mental well-being.  The 
department thus provided training to equip staff on the wards to holistically support 
individuals suffering from mental distress and connected patients to faith leaders and 
communities (e.g. had worked with the local mosques to help patients celebrate 
Ramadan).59  At Herstmonceux, the provider took a proactive approach to 
understanding the needs of different local groups and addressed these alongside 
providing physical health care.  For example, the practice was aware that 40% of its 
patients did not have access to the internet, therefore, concerned about loneliness and 
isolation, it organised regular social events where individuals could meet other 
individuals.  Through these events, patients gained confidence and many had taken 
up new healthy activities as a result of trying them at these sessions.60  Through the 
linking of the outstanding rating with these exemplars of best practice, the CQC is 
encouraging a neo-institutionalist approach to learning in providers, where providers 
are incentivised to survey the range of examples and consider which practices they 
can adopt within their setting.  The Commission explicitly supports this behaviour by 
having a ‘question for reflection’ box alongside the case studies which explicitly asks 
‘what learning from the case studies could I transfer into my organisation?’ As stated 
earlier, this is important as it encourages positive action even where deliberation is not 
possible.  
 
Alongside encouraging a neo-institutionalist approach to learning through the 
promotion of best practice, the CQC also requires mechanisms to be put in place that 
can support deliberative, pragmatic and genetic learning within organisations.  The 
Commission does this by placing a heavy emphasis on person-centred care, allowing 
staff to voice concerns and make suggestions in a non-hierarchical manner, and 
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ensuring providers have procedures in place to ensure that learning from errors and 
mistakes takes place. In terms of deliberative learning, the CQC has numerous 
requirements that will be assessed in inspections.  These include the extent staff 
routinely involve service users and those close to them in planning and making shared 
decisions about their care, support and treatment;61 whether services take account of 
the particular needs and choices of different people (especially supporting individuals 
to make informed choices);62 and whether people who use services, those close to 
them and their representatives are actively engaged and involved in decision-making 
to shape services and culture, including a range of equality groups.63  For example, 
the Commission outlines how Herstmonceux Integrative Health Centre particularly 
excelled at this, establishing a very active patient participation group that has resulted 
in projects such as coffee mornings and health walks.64 
 
In terms of pragmatic learning, this involves removing hierarchies between actors 
within an organisation and establishing an environment where all individuals can 
engage in collective action on a joint basis.  In particular, all parties should be involved 
in designing solutions, monitoring performance and making adjustments and all parties 
should learn through these endeavours.  The Commission advances these conditions 
within providers by assessing during inspections whether the culture of an organisation 
encourages openness and honesty at all levels (including with service users), whether 
staff can raise concerns without fear of retribution and whether appropriate learning 
and action takes place as a result of concerns raised.65  Viewing staff as improvement 
partners is especially important to achieve a high level of equality and human rights 
mainstreaming and there should be a ‘no blame’ culture of learning throughout the 
organisation.66  The CQC particularly praised East London NHS Foundation Trust for 
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their work in this area as one of their overriding principles is that ‘the people who know 
the problem [i.e. the staff] are pivotal to creating the solution.’  Through this, the Board 
supported a staff idea to reduce violence on mental health wards, which resulted in a 
massive reduction in violence.67 
 
Genetic learning is difficult to assess but involves organisations looking at past efforts 
and openly discussing why they were not effective and learning from this exercise.  
The lessons learnt can then be used to inform practices in the future.  This is 
encouraged in providers of care by the Commission assessing the extent to which 
concerns and complaints are used as an opportunity to learn and drive continuous 
improvement;68 and considering whether there are robust systems and processes 
across the organisations for learning, continuous improvement and innovation.69  
Again, this drive to improve is key to a high level of equality and human rights 
mainstreaming with the best providers being organisations that ‘learned from mistakes 
and were always looking for the next thing that they could improve’.70  For example, 
the Docs GP Practice was praised for establishing a learning environment with no 
blame so that when things went wrong it was viewed as a learning opportunity.71 
 
It can be seen that the CQC aims to ensure health and adult social care providers in 
England comply with equality and human rights law by integrating equality and human 
rights into their fundamental standards, measuring the performance of organisations 
against the standards and subjecting non-compliant organisations to sanctions with 
serious consequences. At the same time, alongside this role, they can also support 
organisations to mainstream equality and human rights into their work by encouraging 
them to engage in reflexive learning.  
 
Conclusion 
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Regulators and inspectorates have a significant role to play in establishing an equality 
and human rights culture in their sectors. Yet, so far this role has been largely 
unrealised due to it not being previously clear what role regulators and inspectorates 
could play in the enforcement of equality and human rights. The article argued that 
regulators and inspectorates should use their powers to (i) ensure compliance in the 
organisations they oversee, and (ii) encourage mainstreaming by embedding 
mechanisms for reflexive learning within organisations. It began by outlining the 
limitations of negative duties and the compliance model of enforcement. The increased 
emphasis on positive duties means that alternative models of enforcement are 
required. The second part of the article discussed and expanded on the proactive 
enforcement model put forward by Sandra Fredman, arguing that any enforcement 
model must encourage deliberation, have mechanisms in place to incentivise positive 
action where deliberation is not possible and work in the context of an inverted 
enforcement pyramid (where mechanisms are increasingly encouraging and 
supportive). The third section argued that regulators and inspectorates were especially 
crucial in this environment and that in particular, they should use their powers to 
incentivise the embedding of learning within organisations in order to develop deeper 
mainstreaming. The article concluded by illustrating these arguments in the context of 
the work of the Care Quality Commission.  
 
The article aims to make two main contributions to the academic literature. First, it 
expands on the increasing literature on the effective operationalisation of equality and 
human rights law, outlining an alternative mechanism (the use of regulators and 
inspectorates) to instil an equality and human rights culture within organisations rather 
than solely focusing on public sector organisations themselves.72 Second, the article 
builds on the work of other scholars such as Vincent-Jones and Thomas, to highlight 
the importance of learning in public sector organisations, particularly in the 
administrative justice context and illustrates the specific importance of learning for 
equality and human rights.73 This opens up avenues for further research, for example, 
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exploring empirically the extent regulators and inspectorates can and have embedded 
learning both through their assessment frameworks and through their assessments. 
Additionally, learning can be explored at different levels (i.e. organisation, team and 
individual and the relationship between the three). In this way, the effectiveness of 
regulators and inspectorates can be enhanced so they can make a significant 
contribution to the realisation of equality and human rights in the twenty-first century.      
